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Abstract
We analyze the economic incentives generated by the proof-of-stake mech-
anism discussed in the Ethereum Casper upgrade proposal. Compared with
proof-of-work, proof-of-stake has a different cost structure for attackers. In
Budish (2018), three equations characterize the limits of Bitcoin, which has a
proof-of-work mechanism. We investigate their counterparts and evaluate the
risk of double-spending attack and sabotage attack. We argue that PoS is safer
than PoWagaisnt double-spending attack because of the tractability of attackers,
which implies a large “stock” cost for the attacker. Compared to a PoW system
whose mining equipments are repurposable, PoS is also safer against a sabotage
attack.
1 Introduction
Under proof-of-stake (PoS), networks achieve distributed consensus on a blockchain
by randomly choosing the creator of the next block as function of their stake. The
stake is an amount of the cryptocurrency which is temporarily frozen. If the creator
misbehaves, his stake is burned. Since an attacker faces a large “stock” cost of
misbehaving, PoS is safer than proof-of-work (PoW), which generates a smaller
“flow” cost for the attacker.
We assume that the reader has a basic knowledge of Bitcoin and its PoW mech-
anism. Detailed descriptions can be found in Athey et al. (2016), Huberman et al.
(2017), and Budish (2018). We (1) give a high-level description of the PoSmechanism
discussed in the Casper proposal; (2) consider potential attacks; (3) discuss the con-
nection to Budish (2018); (4) describe some possible solutions to the attacks and their
∗Special thanks to Eric Budish, whose paper laid the foundation for this memo.
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implications; and (5) analyze equilibria. There are different flavors of PoS. In this
memo, we mainly focus on the Casper proposal discussed in Buterin and Griffith
(2017).
2 Proof-of-Stake
In PoS, validators vote on the authentic transactions based on their stake, an amount
of Ethereum that they deposit into an account, which is frozen for a certain period of
time. If they are identified as an attacker, however, they lose their deposit. In contrast,
under PoW, validators are randomly selected based on the computation power they
use. This process costs electricity that prevents attackers to change transaction
records. The criticism of this electricity consumption leads to the invention of PoS.
In this paper, we will not discuss the environmental advantage of PoS. Instead, we
will focus on the tractability of attackers and the scarcity of stakes that leads to a
different cost structure for an outside attacker.
2.1 Validation procedure
For the rest of the paper, all the validators will be weighted by their deposits. When
we say "23 of validators", we refer to the set of validators whose deposits are equal
to 23 of the total deposits. The proof-of-stake in Buterin and Griffith (2017) can be
described as follows.
1. Each block is 10-20 seconds and every 100th block is a checkpoint.
2. At each checkpoint, Ethereum owners can choose to stake Ethereums to be-
come validators and earn rewards. Validators can choose to exit, but cannot
withdraw their deposits until 4 months later.
3. Because of network latency, conflicting blocks may occur. Validators are incen-
tivized to coordinate onwhich checkpoints should be added to the chain as the
canonical history. This coordination is done by broadcasting their intentions
to vote for multiple rounds subjected to certain rules.
4. A checkpoint that is based on a valid history is finalized if 23 of the validators1
vote for the checkpoint.
5. When a checkpoint is finalized, merchants are expected to trust that the trans-
1The number is chosen based on Byzantine fault tolerant consensus theory.
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actions will not be reverted unless 13 of validators maliciously double vote. By
double voting, attackers can trick amerchant to accept the Ethereums that they
have already spent and finalized elsewhere. Honest validators are incentivized
to report such behaviors and burn the Ethereum deposits of the attackers.
6. When two finalized checkpoints conflict, because more than 13 of validators
misbehave, offline coordination2 is expected to resolve the issues. Only one
version will be selected in the end.
3 Potential Attacks
Double-Spending (Finality Reversion) : The process is similar to blockchain. An
attacker (1) acquires 23 of stakes; (2) sends his Ethereum to a merchant in
exchange for goods or assets by voting to finalize a checkpoint that includes the
transactions; 3) finalizes a conflicting checkpoint that sends the same Ethereum
to anothermerchant (double-spends); (4) gets caught and his stakes are burned
as honest validators are incentivezed to report such misbehavior.
Note 13 + 2 is enough for the attack if the network latency is high. Suppose the
attacker owns 13 + 2 of stakes, validators in Europe owns
1
3 −  of stakes, and
validators in Africa own the remaning 13 −  of stakes. The attacker can vote
for the transaction in Europe with the European validators, and then vote for
the conflicting transaction in Africa with the African validators using the same
Ethereums. Then both transactions will be finalized because they have 23 + 
votes. However, Merchants in both Africa and Europemay have only observed
one finalized checkpoint because of the network latency. Both of them will
approve the transaction, but only one of them will get paid eventually.
Sabotage (Going offline) : An attacker owning 13 +  of the stakes can refuse to
vote, which prevents checkpoints of being finalized, which brings transactions
to a halt. Ethereums users are expected to coordinate outside of the network
to censor the malicious validators, but it is an open question that remains
unresolved. We will mentione some possible methods in the Appendix A.3
Both of the attacks can induce conflicting finalized checkpoints and will require
offline coordination by honest users. Wewill discuss the potential difficulty and cost
2For example, organizing a vote on Twitter or some other trustworthy websites.
3Buterin and Griffith (2017) suggested that one way is to gradually down-weight validators who
don’t vote. But there is a likelihood that even if more than 23 of validators are honest, sometimes there
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of the coordination in Appendix A.
4 Connection to Budish (2018)
4.1 Competition Among Miners
Let Pblock be the reward for mining an Ethereum block, N the total stakes deposited
into the frozen account, and c the opportunity cost of not being able to spend the
frozen stakes. Then, we can calculate the equilibrium amount of stakes in the system
N∗ with
N∗c  Pblock (1)
With PoW, the cost mostly involves renting the miningmachines and the variable
cost of the electricity. This equation is analogous to the first equation in Budish
(2018), where, analogously, N∗ is the computational power devoted to mining, and c
is the per-block unit cost of the computational power.
4.2 Incentive Compatibility
Both double-spending and sabotage attacks will lead to losing all the stakes.4 The
equation should approximately be
N attackC > Vattack (2)
where N attack is the number of Ethereums needed to complete the attack; Vattack
is the value of the attack; C is the cost of the Ethereum. 5 For an outsider attacker,
N attack is at least 50% of the total existing stakes, so he will own at least 13 when he
deposits his additional N∗2 Ethereums.
The stakes in PoS is analagous to the chips used to mine the reward in a PoW
network. As discussed in Budish (2018), they fit into the case where the flow cost
approach is not appropriate because "the most efficient chips are specialized, there
are neither reasonably efficient repurposable chips nor older generation specialized
chips".
are conflicting checkpoints because honest validators accidentally go offline.
4It is also possible for the attackers to bribe other validators, The bribing techniques and the
corresponding cost would be an interesting topic to study. But in this paper we mainly focus on the
case when the validators need to own the Ethereum.
5The Ethereum cost C is not strictly linear in N attack because of the limited supply of Ethereum.
When the existing stakes are alreadymore than 23 of total Ethereumsupply, buying sufficientEthereum
for the attack is impossible. However, for simplicity, we assume away this appreciation.
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4.3 Ethereum Cost as a Function of Reward
If we view profit generated by depositing the Ethereum as dividend or interest,
then the Ethereum price should equal to the sum of discounted profit over a infinite
horizon. Thus we can draw the connection between the opportunity cost c and the
Ethereum price C. Let β be the discount rate, then:
C  c
∑
t1
(1 + β + β2 + β3 + ...)  c1 − β . (3)
Both double-spending and sabotage attacks require at least half of the existing
stakes, so N attack  12N
∗. Attackers do not have the incentives to attack when the
value of the attack is smaller than the cost of buying and losing the stakes:
Vattack < N attackC 
1
2N
∗C

1
2(1 − β)N
∗c
(4)
Note the qualitative similarities of both sides of equation (4): both sides have stock
costs. That is, a one-shot gain of an attack must be compared with a perpetual cost.
Compare with the case of PoW, where costs are a flow (Budish, 2018). Equation (4)
implies a higher degree of security for PoS, as stock costs are higher than flow costs.
Appendix Section B argues the long-run equilibrium number of miners is low,
yielding less security. Appendix Section C analyzes the equilibrium interest rate
implied by equation (3).
4.4 Cost Comparison
For notational convenience, let
αether 
1
2(1 − β) (5)
If we assume an annualized discounting factor of 0.98, and β is the discounting
factor of a 10-minute period, then β will be approximately 0.9999996. The correp-
sonding αether is around 106.
Combing equation (1), (4) and (5), we can get
Pblock >
Vattack
αether
(6)
This equation has a similar format as the one discussed in (Budish, 2018), except
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that the composition and magnitude of αether are different. In both of PoW and PoS,
α can be understood as the cost for attackers to misbehave relative to the cost for
honest validators to earn block reward.
In PoS, the honest validators only pay the opportunity cost of depositing the
stakes, but attackers, both double-spenders and saboteurs, lose their stakes.
In PoW, the flow cost of a double spending attack is not qualitatively different
from the flow cost of maintenance for honest validators, as electricity is the only cost.
An example number used by (Budish, 2018) for the Bitcoin coefficient αβ is 3.35,
which will be several magnitude smaller than αether . On the other hand, the cost
of a sabotage attack depends on how repurposable the mining chips are. If chips
are repurpusable, then their preserve value after the network is sabotaged. Thus,
the cost of sabotage is mainly a flow cost from electricity, and is not qualitatively
different from that of honest miners. However, if chips are not repurposable, then
the cost of sabotage includes the cost of the mining chips as well. Thus, the cost
becomes a stock cost.
If Ethereumprices are linear, sabotaging under PoS is cheaper: if we regard stakes
as mining chips, an additional 100% of the current mining power is needed for a
PoW sabotage attack, but only 50% of the current stakes are required for the PoS
attack.6
However, if we consider the possibility of offline coordination that can possibly
resolve the attack and identify the malicious behavior, a PoS network becomes more
expensive to attack. In PoS, the network can analyze the behavior of validators to
identify the malicious ones. In PoW, tracking down the malicious mining machines
and destroying them is difficult. Therefore, even unsuccessful attacks incur in a large
stock cost under PoS.
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A Coordination and Possible Solutions
If double spending or sabotage attack takes place in PoS, coordinations outside of
the network are needed to resolve the conflict.7 Coordinations are not rare at the
current stage of the cryptocurrency development. All kinds of forks and upgrades
for both Bitcoin and Ethereum require offline coordinations, usually on Twitter or
otherwebsites. While attackers are unlikely to have incentives to double spend based
on discussion in Section 4, they still have the incentives to sabotage the system if the
future market is large. There are possible ways to deter the sabotage attacks, with
their own limitations.
A.1 Coordination on eliminating malicious validators
When an attacker owns 13 of the deposit, he can intentionally pretend to be offline
and not voting for any block, resulting in a sabotage attack. Because in PoS it is
possible to track an validator, it is possible to analyze likely malicious behaviors
and censor them from the network. Other honest validators, include exchanges, can
eliminate or censor thesemalicious validators by creating a soft fork of the Ethereum
blockchain that excludes these validators.
This potential punishment can deter a sabotage in multiple ways. For example,
if the attackers target the future market, the future contract will then be based on
the price of this forked chain. In this forked chain, because the valid supply of
Ethereum decreases instead, the price of the Ethereum can possibly increase. Thus,
the attacker will lose both from both the Ethereum stake and the future contract.
Conditional on successful coordination, the potential loss from future contracts is
linearly proportional to the value of the attack. The attackers will take into account
the risk tolerance and the probability of successful coordination when initiating the
attack.
Nevertheless, when a validator goes offline for a period t, it is unclear if he is
malicious or his node experiences some network failure. There also exists other
malicious behavior that will not get punished directly according to the rules. The
7In Bitcoin offline coordinations are not needed because when there exists two blockchain, the
longest one will be chosen.
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detection algorithm of such ambiguously malicious event can mistakingly penalize
honest players, lowering the expected payoff and increasing the risk of an honest
validator.
A.2 Middlemen Cartel
Because stakes are scarce in the PoS mechanism, if the remaning liquid Ethereum is
below 50%of the existing stakes, it becomes imposible for anoutsider to attack. When
the optimal level of deposit is higher than 23 of the total Ethereum, and a group of
firms that run Ethereum-related business and have the incentives to keep the system
safe, then one strategy that they can pursue is to own all of the deposits and promise
consumers to behave honestly. For example, large exchanges whose businesses rely
on cryptocurrency have the incentive to become coordinators when the system is
being attacked. The settlement prices of the current Bitcoin future contracts are all
based on the exchanges. Because all of the information is public, consumers and
coordinating firms can check if everyone keeps their promises. Because the identity
is revealed, it is no longer a one-shot game and there can also be legal consequences
if they break the promise. Of course, it is unclear how different this centralized
middleman is from a traditional middleman. This cartel can censor transactions that
are unfavorable to them or limit the number of transactions to increase profit. One
key difference is that all of these behaviors are transparent and easier for the public
to supervise. If this network has lower cost, traditional middlemen can run such
network in its backend. Under this setting, Ethereum will in some way look like
another cryptocurrency, Ripple, which is run by a coalition of enterprises.
B Competition with Traditional Middlemen: an Upper
Bound for Transaction Fees
If coordinations outside of the network are arbitrary and can even include gov-
ernemnt and large firms who have interest in the network, it is unclear how much
advantage the network has left compared to the traditional payment system.
Currently, miners in either systems are rewarded for adding to the blockchain
with a block-reward, which consists of two parts: a number of newly minted coins,
and the block transaction fees. In the long-run, the number of newly minted coins
will approach zero.8 Thus, the reward will be mainly composed by transaction
8Bitcoin minting will stop around the year 2140.
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fees, which is linear to the security of the system. However, transaction fees are
disciplined by the outside option, which consists of transferring money through
traditional payment systems. Since services such as Visa and Mastercard are cheap
to run, Bitcoin and Ethereum will either charge low transaction fees, or be used
in scenarios in which traditional transaction methods are expensive. However, for
both algorithms, the long-run equilibrium number of miners will be low because
transaction fees will be low. Thus, both PoS and PoW will become less safe in the
long-run.
For Ethereum, its smart contract can provide trust for supporting gambling or
risk-hedging activities that now still charge relatively high transaction fee. As sports
gambling has become legal in the U.S., Ethereum can still possibly sustain large
transaction fee to maintain the security of the system. This smart contract feature
is orgothonal to the PoS mechanism but will be an interesting topic to study in the
future.
C Opportunity Cost of a Deposited Ethereum
This exploratory section is further investigates the opportunity cost of deposited
Ethereums.
Suppose that, in equilibrium, the total number of Ethereum does not change.
Ntotal  Ndeposit + Nliquid (7)
The value of a liquid Ethereum partly lies in the ability to sell them when the
demand surges.
As in Athey et al. (2016), we can use the notion of velocity to establish the
connection between supply and the exchange rate.
Exchange rate  Transaction VolumeVelocity × Supply of Liquid Ethereums
In simpler notations
p 
D
v × Nliquid (8)
where D is the dollar transaction value, p is the exchange rate, or the price of
Ethereum, and v is the velocity term that describes how easy it is to use this currency.
We assume the following: (1) The velocity is approximately constant, because the
opportunity to use them and the corresponding technology has become stable; and
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(2) demand shocks ∆D are i.i.d.
Then the expected payoff of a unit Ethereum based on the demand volatility will
be
rliquid  P(∆p > 0)E[∆p |∆p > 0]
 P(∆D > 0)E[ ∆D
v × Nliquid |∆D > 0]

1
Nliquid
P(∆D > 0)E[∆D
v
|∆D > 0]

1
Nliquid
Pvolatilit y
(9)
where we let Pvolatilit y  P(∆D > 0)E[∆Dv |∆D > 0] denote the total expected pay-
off generated by demand volatility. In equation (3), the discount factor β can be
interpreted as rliquid .
This equation says that the expected payoff a liquid ethereum is inversely pro-
portional to the total liquid supply, conditional on a demand shock distribution.
Equation (1) N∗c  Pblock suggests that the unit profit of a deposited Ethereum
is inversely proportional to the total number of deposit.
Ndeposit  0 N∗ Ndeposit  Ntotal
c
c  PblockNdeposit rliquid 
Pvolatilit y
Nliquid
rliqu
id
Finally, the current level of deposit is determined by the demand distribution,
the velocity of the currency, and the block reward, Pblock .
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